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URBAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE 
PROMISE OF FOR-PROFIT PHILANTHROPY 
VICTOR FLEISCHER* 
INTRODUCTION 
The entrepreneurial spirit is universal. Challenges to raising 
capital vary from region to region, however, making a comparative 
analysis of entrepreneurship a potentially fruitful inquiry. The fo­
cus of the conference, of course, is on urban entrepreneurship, 
which I understand to mean start-up businesses in economically dis­
advantaged urban areas. Entrepreneurs seeking investment for 
projects in urban areas face unusual barriers in raising capital. The 
chief problem, I think, is that many urban projects, even profitable 
ones, are slow-growth projects; traditional venture capital seeks out 
investments in new technologies that promise to disrupt existing 
product markets, thereby generating the outsized returns that sup­
port the venture capital business model. Traditional solutions to 
the urban-entrepreneurship challenge include community networks, 
investments from nonprofits, and investment tax credits, but, as I 
explain, each of these solutions suffers from significant limitations. 
A promising alternative is emerging, however: for-profit philan­
thropy-altruistic investments guided by the discipline and account­
ability of for-profit venture investing.! While no panacea, for-profit 
philanthropy may supplement the other efforts necessary to make 
urban environments more conducive to entrepreneurship. 
I. THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT Is UNIVERSAL 
Evidence of the entrepreneurial spirit is tucked away in all 
sorts of places, from locales we normally think of-like Boulder 
* Associate Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. This Essay is based 
on my remarks at the Current Issues in Community Economic Development Confer­
ence held at the Western New England College School of Law on March 30, 2007. 
thank my research assistant, George Green, for his assistance in preparing these 
remarks. 
1. On the desirability of for-profit charities as institutions, albeit outside the en­
trepreneurship context, see generally Eric A. Posner & Anup Malani, The Case for For­
Profit Charities (Univ. Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 304,2006), available 
at http://ssrn.comJabstracUd=928976. 
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and Silicon Valley-to large cities like Los Angeles and New York. 
The entrepreneurial spirit also thrives in rural areas of the United 
States, as well as throughout Europe and Israel, in India and China, 
and in Africa and Latin America.2 Urban areas of the United 
States are no exception, of course. 
Differences in human capital exist. For example, a CEO in a 
struggling inner-city environment in the Rust Belt may have to 
devote more hours to training workers than a CEO in Silicon Val­
ley.3 But I am skeptical of explanations of entrepreneurship that 
place too much weight on vague descriptions of entrepreneurial cul­
ture or attitude. Culture in this broad sense may also prove difficult 
to change, at least in a positive direction, through government 
regulation. 
Nor should we ignore the importance of venturesome consum­
ers.4 Consumers who are locked into comfortable patterns, or who 
are distrustful of change, present an additional obstacle to entrepre­
neurs seeking to disrupt product markets. For the remainder of this 
Essay, then, I will focus on regional variations in seeking invest­
ment capital. 
Consider the barriers to raising investment capital. In general, 
investors have two needs: (1) a legal regime that makes them com­
fortable investing in a venture managed by someone else, and that 
is relatively free from corruption and confiscatory taxes; and (2) a 
belief that they will achieve a satisfactory return on their invest­
ments relative to the risk of loss.5 The United States has a legal 
regime that, for the most part, is supportive of entrepreneurs. This 
is generally true in urban environments, as well as in Silicon Valley. 
The greater challenge facing urban entrepreneurs is convincing in­
vestors that they will receive a sufficient return on their investment. 
2. See generally NIELS BOSMA & REBECCA HARDING, GLOBAL ENTREPRENEUR­
SHIP MONITOR, GEM 2006 SUMMARY RESULTS (2007), available at http://www.gem 
consortium.orgldownload.asp?fid=532 (describing the results of a cross-country entre­
preneurship study of forty-two countries). 
3. See generally Edward L. Glaeser, Entrepreneurship and the City (Harvard Inst. 
of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2139, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1001108 (finding a strong connection between area-level education and 
entrepreneurship). 
4. See Amar Bhide, Venturesome Consumption, Innovation and Globalization, 
Paper for a Joint Conference at CESifo and the Center on Capitalism and Society: 
Perspectives on the Performance of the Continent's Economies 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.bhide.netlbhide_venturesome30nsumption.pdf. 
5. For a useful discussion, see Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A 
Review of Issues, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1320 (1997). 
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In seeking to overcome this challenge, urban entrepreneurs 
face an enormous information barrier. Entrepreneurs have to 
somehow convince investors that their business plan has greater 
growth potential than other small business proposals. This is a 
greater challenge in the urban context because many urban busi­
ness model ideas don't fit the traditional venture capital paradigm. 
Venture capital-backed entrepreneurship tends to focus on technol­
ogies that have the potential to disrupt existing product markets 
and generate enormous returns.6 It's these spectacular home run 
investments that can justify "nosebleed" valuations and allow inves­
tors to swallow the losses from the significant number of invest­
ments that will fail.7 Many urban start-ups, by contrast, are looking 
for success on a smaller scale. This doesn't necessarily diminish 
their importance to social welfare, but it does reduce their chances 
of finding traditional venture capital. 
II. No CLEAR PATH TO CASH 
There are untapped product markets and underutilized labor 
markets in urban areas,s and it's possible for venture capital-backed 
entrepreneurs to reach a portion of these markets. There's no in­
trinsic barrier to funding; nor is there a conspiracy that makes 
profit-seeking venture capitalists turn away from urban markets. I 
recently saw a pitch by a company called GoUrban.net, which 
wants to be an Internet portal and online retailer for the urban mar­
ket.9 I think it will find traditional venture capital funding-but 
only if it can convince the venture capitalists that the business is 
truly disruptive of existing product markets. If, on the other hand, 
the portal only looks like it facilitates the entry of new users into 
the web commerce arena who would rather spend their cash else­
where, GoUrban.net will have trouble finding funding. But, in that 
sense, the challenges facing GoUrban.net are not fundamentally 
different from other technology companies. 
6. See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 1737, 1764 (1994) (discussing and defining the "home run mentality" in venture 
capital investing as receiving a return that is greater than two times the investment); 
Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77, 90 (2005). 
7. Fleischer, supra note 6, at 90. 
8. See, e.g., Lee Romney, Retailers See Gold in Poor Areas, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 
2001, at 1; Robert Sharoff, Book Chain Taps Underserved Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 25, 2004, at C6 (describing Borders Books and Music's efforts to place stores in 
untapped urban areas). 
9. GoUrban.net, http://www.gourban.netJabout.php (last visited Apr. 7, 2007). 
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The tougher challenge is for slow-growth companies, like 
smaller retail businesses, grocery stores, bakeries, laundromats, 
clothing stores, for-profit educators, and many service providers. 
Many of these companies can provide incremental improvements 
over the status quo, but it's unlikely that they will disrupt entire 
product markets. In this context, the more logical sources of capital 
are traditional corporations that extend incrementally into new 
markets through franchises or by opening stores in new areas, as 
companies like Wal-Mart, Target, and Starbucks are trying to do.1° 
For example, suppose there's an entrepreneur who wants to 
open a new store on 125th Street in Harlem that will sell a line of 
upscale men's shoes primarily to the African American consumer 
market in the area. Should she make a pitch to traditional venture 
capitalists? Probably not. Venture capitalists simply are not likely 
to supply the needed capital to this market. No matter how impres­
sive the entrepreneur, venture capitalists won't make the invest­
ment because the business model-upscale men's shoes-isn't 
inherently disruptive. Without the promise of a home run product, 
slow-growth companies simply won't attract traditional venture 
capital. Unless she can pitch the company as the next Crocsll-and 
who saw that one coming?-the road to venture capital will be a 
long haul. As with any other market, there's a huge information 
gap between the entrepreneur with the idea and the investors with 
the capital. 
III. 	 COMMUNITY NETWORKS, NONPROFITS, AND TAX CREDITS: 
THE TRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS 
There are a handful of traditional solutions for finding capital 
for urban entrepreneurship. The first is community networking. 
Frequently, this just means informal associations of friends and 
family that provide capital to small business owners, even when the 
return on the investment is quite uncertain.12 They rely on noncon­
tractual methods to guard against shirking and other moral hazard 
10. See, e.g., Craig Harris, Starbucks Wants to Open 40,000 New Stores, SEATTLE 
PosT-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 5, 2006, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.comlbusiness/ 
287643_sbuxgrow05ww.html; News Release, Target Corp., Target to Open 60 New 
Stores (Oct. 7, 2005), http://investors.target.com!phoenix.zhtml?c=65828&p=irol-new­
sArticIe&ID=765407&highlight=; Wal-Mart Sees Room for Over 1,500 New Stores, 
MSNBC.coM, Feb. 8, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11233081/. 
11. Crocs, Our History, http://www.crocs.com!companylhistory/ (discussing how 
Crocs went from merely "boating/outdoor" shoes to a "bona-fide phenomenon"). 
12. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communi­
ties and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 116 (2004) (asserting 
97 2007] URBAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
risks.13 Historically, these networks have tended to be ethnically 
homogeneous, and often, but not always, centered around immi­
grant groups.14 In New York, for example, there are-just to name 
a few-Korean grocers, Orthodox Jews in the diamond district, and 
African American bakeries in Harlem. But, family and ethnic ties 
only extend so far, and the model becomes less useful as our urban 
communities become more heterogeneous. Further, as a matter of 
public policy we cannot count on financing from friends and family 
to generate the optimal level of economic activity. 
Some nonprofits try to pick up where community networks 
stop. Examples include the New Hampshire Community Loan 
Fund,15 the Minority Business Enterprise Center,16 and the Self­
Help Ventures Fund,17 each of which provides start-up financing to 
underserved communities. The trouble is that nonprofits have a 
tendency to suffer from a lack of accountability because nonprofit 
managers are agents without principals. Without the profit motive 
to guide behavior, there's a greater risk that nonprofit managers 
choose suboptimal projects.18 Similarly, it's difficult for donors or 
investors to monitor what's going on.19 
Tax credits offer another, albeit limited, method of moving 
capital to urban entrepreneurs. Under the New Markets Tax 
Credit, for example, investors can receive a tax credit, staggered 
over seven years, for up to thirty-nine percent of their investment in 
low-income communities through government-certified in­
termediaries.20 While the scheme likely lowers the cost of capital 
that "[t]he presence of community may be especially important for the poor who rely 
on it as a form of insurance or risk sharing"). 
13. See Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards 
a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2351-52 (2004) 
(describing how community networks can serve as robust private law mechanisms for 
enforcing industry norms). 
14. Id. at 2344-45 (describing the ethnic homogeneity of cotton-mill owners and 
the even greater homogeneity of Orthodox Jewish diamond dealers in New York City). 
15. N.H. Cmty. Loan Fund, Coos County Entrepreneurial Investment Program, 
http://www.nhcIf.org/newsffillotson.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2007). 
16. Minority Bus. Enter. Ctr., About Us, http://www.mbecwa.comlaboutlindex. 
html (last visited Apr. 9, 2007). 
17. Self-Help Ventures Fund, Commercial Lending, http://www.self-help.org/ 
commerciallending/index.asp (last visited Apr. 9, 2007). 
18. See generally, e.g., Symposium, Who Guards the Guardians?: Monitoring and 
Enforcement of Charity Governance, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 543 (2005) (discussing law 
enforcement and reform). 
19. See generally id. 
20. Cmty. Dev. Fin. Inst. Fund, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, New Markets Tax Credits 
Program, http://www.cdfifund.gov/whacwe_do/programs_id.asp?programID=5 (last 
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for certain projects, it's difficult to assess whether the best projects 
are getting funded.21 Further, it's not clear to what extent the tax 
credit is, in fact, causing an increase in investment in low-income 
communities.22 The Byzantine planning requirements provide mul­
tiple opportunities for rent seeking and hardly suggest an efficient 
structure.23 
Entrepreneurs must also develop specialized human capital to 
acquire tax credits-either by learning the process themselves, or 
finding intermediaries such as nonprofits and lawyers who can assist 
them with the funding process. Just as urban entrepreneurs may 
not be familiar with the path to traditional venture capital, they also 
may be unfamiliar with the tax credit world, placing them at a com­
parative disadvantage with seasoned businesses. In the real estate 
context, for example, we often observe repeat players applying for 
low-income housing tax credits.24 This suggests that the complexity 
of the tax credit programs creates its own unique barrier to entry. 
I don't mean to suggest that community networks, nonprofits, 
and tax credits can't be useful sources of support for urban entre­
preneurship. But there seem to be significant limitations, particu­
larly for new entrepreneurs and for ambitious companies that seek 
faster growth rates. 
visited Apr. 5, 2007); see U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX POLICY: NEW 
MARKETS TAX CREDIT ApPEARS TO INCREASE INVESTMENT BY INVESTORS IN Low­
INCOME COMMUNITIES, BUT OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO BETTER MONITOR COMPLIANCE 
(2007) [hereinafter GAO TAX POLICY], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d07296.pdf. 
21. For a discussion of government intervention in venture capital markets, see 
Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067 (2003). 
22. GAO TAX POLICY, supra note 20, at 53 ("[GAO's] statistical evidence may 
only establish an association between the credit and increased investment, not that the 
program causes the increase. In any case, the indication that the program increases 
investment is not sufficient to support conclusions about the program's effectiveness 
...."). 
23. Id. at 7. "The process of making a[] [New Market Tax Credit] investment 
involves several steps and a number of stakeholders." !d. The report then goes on to 
describe the elaborate process by which an intermediary can become certified to pro­
vide tax credits to its investors, the process by which applicants can seek capital from 
these investors, and the method for evaluating the suitability and worthiness of appli­
cants. Id. 
24. See Nestor Davidson, Values and Value Creation by Lawyers in Public-Private 
Transactions (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
99 2007] URBAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
IV. FOR-PROFIT PHILANTHROPY AS A USEFUL ALTERNATIVE 
For-profit philanthropy, while no panacea for urban problems, 
might be a valuable (and currently"underutilized) alternative source 
of capital for urban entrepreneurship. As I use the term here, for­
profit philanthropy means an investment guided by traditional, for­
profit principles of accountability and return on investment, but 
where the primary motivation for the investment is altruistic. These 
ventures might generate a profit, but if so, it's just gravy. The real 
motivation is giving something back to the community, and this 
philanthropic impulse helps investors stomach greater uncertainty 
and take on greater risk than they would otherwise take, given the 
expected returns. The following are three examples of for-profit 
philanthropy. 
A. Angels 
In the venture capital context, angel investors bridge the gap 
between financing a new business yourself (or with the help of fam­
ily) and the first round of venture-capital financing. Angels are 
often former entrepreneurs with some knowledge of the underlying 
industry. For example, a software entrepreneur might look to foun­
ders of successful software companies to get some p.arly funding. 
Angels typically take a minority equity stake in the new business 
and often serve formally on the board of directors or offer informal 
advice and mentoring to the entrepreneur. If all goes well, in a few 
months, or a year or two, the company will then seek venture fi­
nancing, at which point venture capitalists will take over the lead 
role in counseling and guiding the company towards an initial pub­
lic offering or other exit. 
Angel investors are normally thought of as for-profit investors, 
not philanthropists.25 But when you talk to angels, it becomes clear 
that many subscribe to a much broader mission.26 Many are former 
entrepreneurs who see angel investing as a method of giving the 
next generation a hand up. As Professor Ibrahim has documented, 
25. For an analysis of angel investing that assumes a for-profit motive, see John L. 
Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A Proposal to Expand 
the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
861 (2005). 
26. See Posting of Gillian Parrillo to Sacramento Executive, What Kind of Angel 
Are You?, http://www.sacramentoexecutive.comI2006/02/whaCkind_oCangel_are_you. 
html (Feb. 13, 2006, 12:39 PST). 
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many angels value the social benefits of angel investing.27 Angels 
can participate in the excitement of being part of a start-up, and 
"stave off the boredom of retirement. "28 Angels often invest close 
to home, so they can visit and consult with founders. Many invest 
in ventures that may generate broader social welfare gains, like 
greentech and cleantech, or that will produce jobs in the angel's 
community.29 "Psychic income" becomes an important factor.3D 
Once in a while, of course, an angel investment turns into mil­
lions of dollars.31 The profit motive is often present alongside these 
other nonfinancial motivations. But that is precisely the attraction 
of for-profit philanthropy; it has become a method of providing 
both the money and discipline of venture capital to a start-up that 
isn't yet ready to receive traditional venture capital. 
B. Google.org 
Google.org is the "philanthropic arm" of Google.32 It invests 
in projects such as providing market-based solutions to global pov­
erty33 and creating a better hybrid car.34 By keeping the projects 
under the for-profit umbrella of Google, the Google founders and 
managers are likely to achieve more accountability than if they 
made a corporate charitable contribution to an outside nonprofit. 
Additionally, it's worth noting that, while it may seem counter­
intuitive, Google still gets a pretty good tax break. In For-Profit 
Charities, Professors Eric Posner and Anup Malani suggest that we 
should allow for-profit entities engaging in charitable activities to 
receive deductible contributions of capital and operate free from an 
entity-level tax.35 Google.org achieves the same improvement in 
27. See Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior ofAngel Investors 33 
(Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 07-16, 2007), available at http://ssrn.coml 
abstract=984899. 
28. ld. at 32. 
29. See id. at 33. 
30. /d. 
31. Jeanne Lee, How to Fund Other Startups (And Get Rich), CNNMoNEY.coM, 
May 31, 2006, http://money.cnn.coml2006/05/30/smbusiness/angels_wealthbuilders_fsb/ 
index.htm (describing some home run angel investments). 
32. Google.org, Welcome to Google.org, http://www.google.org/ (last visited Apr. 
9,2007). 
33. Google.org, Global Economic Development, http://www.google.org/develop­
ment.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2007). 
34. Google.org, Climate Change, http://www.google.org/climate.html (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2007). 
35. 26 U.S.c. § 501(c)(3) (2000). The mechanics that would be used are unclear 
from the early draft of the paper. Posner & Malani, supra note 1, at 18. 
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accountability and significant tax benefits, but without creating the 
same sort of nightmare of administrative compliance that changing 
the tax code would require in this context. When Google puts 
money into its Google.org subsidiary, and the subsidiary spends the 
money on things like research and development, the .org subsidiary 
will quickly generate operating losses. Assuming the .org subsidi­
ary remains part of the parent company's consolidated tax return, 
the operating losses will soak up income from Google's normal 
profit-making activities. Not all of the money contributed to the 
.org will generate immediate deductions-some investments will be 
capitalized, and some will later generate income. But each dollar 
contributed to Google.org might generate, say, twenty or twenty­
five cents of tax benefits to Google, versus thirty-five cents, at most, 
for a corporate charitable contribution. At the same time 
Google.org can operate free from both the income tax charitable 
deduction adjusted gross income limitations and the definitional 
constraints of § 501(c)(3).36 
The Google.org model is attractive in part because the .org 
subsidiary can draw on the resources and expertise of the rest of the 
Google team. Unlike traditional nonprofits, which for tax reasons 
must limit profit-seeking activities, the philanthropic arm of Google 
can blur the lines and draw on expertise from the entire 
organiza tion. 
C. Magic Johnson 
A third example, returning to the urban context, is Johnson 
Development Corporation.37 The corporation and its founder, 
Earvin "Magic" Johnson, have succeeded in bringing retail centers 
and entertainment complexes to underserved urban markets, 
largely by forging partnerships with traditional for-profit corpora­
tions like Washington Mutual, Starbucks, and TGI Fridays.38 The 
success of these various arrangements highlights the discipline and 
accountability of for-profit ventures.39 
36. See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Why Limit Charity? (Univ. Ill. Law & Econ., 
Research Paper No. LE07-020, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=993541. 
37. Johnson Dev. Corp., Our Mission, http://www.johnsondevelopmentcorp.coml 
main.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2007). 
38. See id. 
39. Id.; see also Johnson Dev. Corp., Magic Johnson Theaters, http://www. 
johnsondevelopmentcorp.comltheaters/index.html (last visited Oct. 11,2007) [hereinaf­
ter Magic Johnson Theaters]. 
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But I would be surprised if profit was Mr. Johnson's sole or 
even primary motivation when he first partnered with Sony En­
tertainment to build the Magic Johnson Theaters back in 1994.40 At 
the time, there was significant uncertainty about whether the busi­
ness model would work. Mr. Johnson was not just a founder and 
capital provider, but also an intermediary who could bridge the gap 
between the other capital providers and the urban community that 
the businesses served. I suspect that Mr. Johnson, like many suc­
cessful entrepreneurs, was looking to give something back to the 
community, and the for-profit model has made that gift more suc­
cessful than a straight donation would have been. For-profit philan­
thropy is the gift that keeps on giving. 
CONCLUSION 
Urban entrepreneurs operate under conditions of great uncer­
tainty that make it difficult to raise money from traditional sources. 
Unlike technology entrepreneurs, who also operate under condi­
tions of great uncertainty, urban entrepreneurs often cannot court 
venture capital with the dreams of disrupting entire product mar­
kets. Relying on friends and family, traditional nonprofits, and tax 
credits have proved insufficient to bridge the entire funding gap. 
For-profit philanthropy presents an exciting new model to create 
some of the most exciting urban ventures of the twenty-first 
century. 
40. Magic Johnson Theaters, supra note 39. 
